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INTRODUCTION
There are three primary theories that have shaped scholars’ understanding of
Article II’s Executive Power Clause. The first is the cross-reference, which points
to specific powers under Article II, such as the appointment power.1 The second
is the Royal Residuum theory that interprets Article II as granting wide-ranging
powers possessed by the eighteenth-century British Crown-like executive officer.2 And finally, the third is the Law Execution theory which rests on an interpretation that the “clause grants power to execute the laws and is otherwise an empty
vessel until it has legislative instructions to carry out.”3 American emergency

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to the Georgetown
Law Center’s JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY for inviting me to participate in the 2020
Symposium on Presidential Emergency Powers: Legal Framework and Perspectives for Reform.
Special thanks to Joshua Geltzer, Jamil Jaffer, and Mary McCord for a lively panel discussion. © 2021,
Jerry Dickinson.
1. See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1269 (2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.

203

204

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 12:203

powers doctrine is historically premised upon the Royal Residuum theory, the
notion that Article II’s Executive Power Clause constitutes little, if any, limitation
on the broad grant of expansive powers to the President. As President Harry S.
Truman explained, “[t]he Power of the President should be used in the interest of
the people and in order to do that the President must use whatever power the
Constitution does not expressly deny him.”4 In Youngstown Sheet and Tube v.
Sawyer, the government argued that there was an inherent emergency power in
the President that distinguished Article I from Article II.5 This view purportedly
derives from the founding generation’s understanding of executive power as vesting broad authority that extends further than merely, say, executing the laws.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton insisted that the executive power was not restricted,
but instead conferred expansive powers.6
This expansive view permits presidential action that is neither authorized nor
prohibited by Congress.7 It also views presidential power in times of emergency
as indefeasible even when the executive exercises powers prohibited by
Congress.8 It provides an extraordinary menu of discretionary policies to the
Executive in times of crisis. In fact, some former Supreme Court Justices have
rejected the view that “[t]he broad executive power granted by Article II . . . cannot . . . be invoked to avert disaster.”9 Even the more moderate version of this theorem still envisions Article II’s Executive Power Clause as a non-absolute power
that provides the Executive wide-ranging power in times of emergency over
national security or foreign affairs, “so long as neither the Constitution nor any
specific statute forbids it.”10
Scholarly, judicial, and political discourses have been dominated by the Royal
Residuum view, also known at the Vesting Clause Thesis, to broaden and
entrench the Executive’s power over foreign affairs and national security, including emergencies.11 Since the eighteenth century, this expansive interpretation of
the executive’s inherent powers during times of emergency has influenced decisions by administration after administration over when and how to respond to
4. MARCUS CUNLIFFE, AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 343 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting
President Truman).
5. J. MALCOLM SMITH & CORNELIUS P. COTTER, POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISIS 135
(1960).
6. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 38–40 (H.
Syrett eds., 1969).
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(defining Zone Two as presidential action). Justice Jackson set forth a tripartite test in his concurring
opinion, laying out three zones of Presidential power. Zone One is when Congress gives authority for the
President’s action. Zone Two is when Congress is silent, also known as the twilight zone. And finally
Zone Three is when Congress disapproves Presidential actions.
8. See id. at 637–38 (defining Zone Three).
9. Id. at 708 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
10. Mortenson, supra note 1, at 1272.
11. There are other sources of this expansive executive power that scholars and various
administrations have relied upon, including Article II’s Commander and Chief Clause, as well as the
Take Care Clause; see, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1172–73 (2019).
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exigencies and to act with flexibility depending upon the crisis situation. Yet,
while the Constitution declares the executive power shall be vested in the
President, important basic questions have remained unanswered about “[w]hat is
executive power? What is the degree, and what are the limitations? . . . What are
its boundaries?”12 Julian Mortenson’s recent scholarship challenges the dominant
view of executive power, its degree, and its limitations, arguing that the view “is
so entrenched in our constitutional culture, we must uproot it systematically.”13
Indeed, recent scholarship suggests the executive power is, at its core, merely
the power to “carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative
power” and to implement “substantive legal requirements and authorities that
were created somewhere else.”14 Few, if any, scholars, however, have drawn a
link between the original understanding of the Executive Power Clause and its
relationship to emergency powers doctrine under the theory of liberal constitutionalism. This Essay addresses this gap in the scholarship, and offers musings
about the doctrinal and political implications of an originalist reading of the
Executive Power Clause in relation to crisis government and emergency powers
doctrine. If, as Mortenson argues, Article II is to be read as merely the power to
execute the laws and nothing more, then we must question whether our longstanding expansive view of emergency powers, as derived from Article II, is also
wrong. If so, what are the political and doctrinal implications for a narrowed,
originalist understanding of Article II in times of emergency?
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets forth the traditional theories of
emergency powers. From the absolutist to the relativist to the liberal, these competing theories have established the basic frameworks that attempt to resolve tensions between law and necessity during times of crisis.15 While the liberal theory
dominated discourse and action in the early Republic, the relativist view has
become the dominant view of emergency powers.16 Part II will seek to revive liberal constitutionalism in emergency powers doctrine by focusing on recent scholarship arguing that the Law Execution theory of executive power meant the
power “was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or instructions
that needed executing” by the legislature.17 Like the relativist theory of emergency powers displacing liberal constitutionalism, the Royal Residuum Theory
likewise has long dispatched the Law Execution theory in executive powers interpretation. Yet, a revised originalist interpretation of the Law Execution theory is
based in seventeenth and eighteenth-century originalism where the “ordinary
meaning of ‘executive power’ referred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and
potent authority” to simply execute the laws created by the legislature. This

12. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 229–30 (1926) (Reynolds, J., dissenting) (quoting 4 DANIEL
WEBSTER, THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 186 (1851)).
13. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1174.
14. Id. at 1173–1174.
15. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1989).
16. Id. at 1392
17. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1169.
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Essay seeks to supplement an original understanding of the Article II Executive
Powers Clause with liberal constitutionalism’s theory that is based on a
Madisonian-centric conception of government. Part III offers musings on the political and doctrinal implications of a resuscitated vision of liberal constitutionalism and emergency powers under the Law Execution Theory of executive
powers.
I. EMERGENCY POWERS THEORY
A. Absolutist
There are three major frameworks for resolving tensions “between law and
necessity.”18 The first is the “absolutist” view. This theory discards the idea that
the federal government enjoys emergency powers during times of crisis. The absence of any explicit emergency powers within the U.S. Constitution, under this
theory, is evidence that the federal government is not vested with such power.19
Underlying this perspective is an understanding that the absence of such emergency powers in the Constitution implies that a sufficient amount of power already exists within the confines of the Constitution to preserve the existence of
the sovereign without the need for the suspension of rights provisions or other
extra-constitutional powers.20
As the Supreme Court explained in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, the “Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency” and no
such provisions of necessity were included.21 This view “suppresses the tension
between law and necessity” in that it denies the necessity for emergency powers
in times of crisis.22 The Court, likewise, in Ex Parte Milligan interpreted the
Constitution’s silence on any emergency or suspension powers as evidence that
the framers “left the rest (powers) to remain forever inviolable.”23 Note, however,
that the absolutist theory also acknowledges that if there were a necessity to
address crisis or emergency, preserving the nation would be secondary to liberty
during times of emergency.24
B. Relativist
The relativist view, unlike the absolutist view, interprets the Constitution to
permit expansive executive powers in extraordinary circumstances.25 The relativist theory of emergency powers rests, in part, on a rationale that the Constitution
implicitly grants the executive the power to act if there is necessity to intervene in

18. Lobel, supra note 15, at 1386.
19. Id. at 1386–1387.
20. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1934).
21. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 290 U.S. 398, 425–26 (1934).
22. Lobel, supra note 15, at 1387.
23. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
24. Id.
25. Lobel, supra note 15, at 1388.
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a crisis, such as the suspension of rights or of the Constitution. The Constitution,
under this theory, is a “flexible document that permits the President to take whatever measures are necessary in crisis situations.”26 This is a Hamiltonian view of
expansive powers of the federal government in which such powers “ought to exist
without limitation” because of the unknown circumstances that may arise.27
Indeed, such power, according to President Franklin Roosevelt, means that the
executive may ignore legislative acts constraining executive powers during times
of emergency when “necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with”
certain crises.28 This is the modern day theorem held by many theorists and is the
basis for current frameworks of emergency powers statutes.
C. Liberal Constitutionalism
The theory of liberal constitutionalism, or liberal legalism, is known as the
post-World War II default system of constitutional politics.29 It is based on a written constitution, judicial review, and a commitment to, among other things, democratic elections and the rule of law.30 This model seeks to encourage democracy
and limit governmental power. As Jethro Lieberman explains, “the idea of constitutionalism comprises a cluster of particular jurisprudential and sociological
attributes, summed up as ‘limited government under a higher law.’”31 James
Madison famously explained, “[y]ou must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”32 In the emergency
powers context, liberal constitutionalism seeks to “resolve the tension between
law and necessity” by preserving the dichotomy between ordinary and emergency
power.33 The preservation is dependent upon strong controls on the governed,
especially the executive.
According to constitutionalism, only the most extraordinary of emergencies
permit executive action. Under this theory, the Constitution does not grant the
President inherent emergency powers and any such invocation of those powers is
unconstitutional. Liberalism, then, makes a distinction between the constitutional
order and a separate framework that provides “the executive with the power, but
not legal authority, to act in an emergency.”34 The primary example of the activation of such emergency powers under this classical liberal theory is war. For
example, the world of law and politics operate between two opposites—war and

26. Id.
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
28. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 250–51 (4th ed. 1957).
29. Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (2018).
30. Id.
31. Jethro K. Lieberman, Constitutionalism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 730,
730 (Michael T. Gibbons ed. 2015) (quoting David Fellman, Constitutionalism, in 1 DICTIONARY OF THE
HIST. OF IDEAS (P.P. Wiener ed. 1973)).
32. FEDERALIST 51 at 347, 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
33. Lobel, supra note 15, at 1388.
34. Id. at 1390.
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peace. The Constitution permits the President to repel attacks. But, the power to
address a crisis beyond repelling an attack was dependent upon congressional authorization. Otherwise, the exercise of executive powers during times of emergency
was unconstitutional without either precondition met. Indeed, as Jules Lobel
explains, under a liberal theory, “the executive should be forced to seek specific congressional authorization prior to acting.”35 In situations where an extraordinary
emergency makes prior congressional authorization impossible, the President should
respond “to such emergencies by openly acting unconstitutionally” and “then immediately seek congressional and public ratification of such action.”36
D. Emergencies and Executive Authority
One of the most recognized examples of the dichotomy between the emergencys
power and executive powers was the Court’s Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company
v. Sawyer decision. There, the majority opinion and multiple concurring and dissenting opinions, taken together, created a basic framework for understanding the executive power during times of emergency. Variations of absolutism, relativism and
liberal constitutionalism permeated the opinions. Justice Black’s majority opinion
was a quintessential conception of liberal constitutionalism. His opinion established
a basis where there exists no inherent executive power and the President may only
act if there is constitutional or statutory authority. This model acknowledges that the
Court does have the power to strike down presidential actions not explicitly authorized under the Constitution or by statute.
Justice Douglas offered a different conception, noting that the Constitution does
not permit the President to act when he usurps the power of Congress to spend.
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, saw Presidential action in the face of congressional omission as clear congressional disapproval. Justice Jackson’s “tripartite”
framework filled in some of the holes and gaps in both Justice Black’s and
Frankfurter’s opinions. He offered the “twilight zone” where Presidential acts are
unconstitutional in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority
to act. And in some instances the President has the power to act unless his actions violate a constitutional and statutory provision; that is, unless Congress acts to stop the
President after the fact. But there also existsenvisions a world in which the President
may exercise his powers and act over matters of national concern unless or until his
actions clearly violate constitutional provisions.
The debate over these models played out quite dramatically throughout the opinions of the Justices. Justice Clark explained that Article II “does grant to the
President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency”
and “necessary to the very existence to the Constitution itself.”37 Yet Justice
Douglas disagreed, noting, “[i]f we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the
President, we would be expanding Article II . . . and rewriting it to suit the political

35. Id. at 1427.
36. Id. at 1428.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring).
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conveniences of the present emergency” and acknowledged that Article II vests the
executive power in the President, and thus “defines that power with particularity.”38
Justice Douglas’s concern was that permitting the steel seizure after declaring a
national emergency would require reading Article II “as giving the President not
only the power to execute the laws but to make some” and that such a determination
would “alter the pattern of the Constitution.”39 Justice Vinson’s dissent balked at the
narrowed scope of executive powers during times of emergency set forth by the majority, instead arguing that if the “broad executive power granted by Article II to the
President cannot “be invoked to avert disaster,” it essentially renders the President a
“messenger-boy” who must first recommend to Congress certain action.40 But the
messenger concern is elevated when crisis strikes, and government must respond
with efficiency and speed in order to address a nation under the state of exception.
Underlying the absolutist, relativist, and liberal theories, along with the
Youngstown Models, is the work of Carl Schmitt, whose scholarship laid a fundamental foundation for understanding the “state of exception”; that is, the state in
which government operates and addresses a national crisis or emergency beyond
the confines of the law.”41 In his work, Schmitt looks to Roman law as guidance.
There, the government was permitted to authorize a temporary dictator to hold
powers for a finite period of time, thus creating a state in which there were rules
for normal times and rules for states of exception.42 However, Schmitt departs
from liberal constitutionalism. He argues law cannot control politics.43 This view
envisions a world where even during times of crisis, when law supposedly constrains the executive, government always has the discretionary power to impose
the state of exception, because the “[s]overeign is he who decides on the [state of]
exception.”44 At some point, the law ceases to constrain and inevitably is discarded during times of crisis—the law runs out.45 This theory of emergency
powers argues that such extraordinary powers are wholly unconstrained by law.
This perspective tracks closely to the work of Clinton Rossiter. He argued that
during times of crisis, government “must be temporarily altered to whatever
degree is necessary to overcome the peril and restore normal conditions.”46 Once
activated, government transforms itself into one with more power and the “people
38. Id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 708 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
41. CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans., 2014) (1922)
[hereinafter SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP]; CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 2005) (1922) [hereinafter SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY]. See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans.,
1976) (1932).
42. SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 41, at 1-2.
43. SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 41, at 17.
44. Id. at 5.
45. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Chicago Univ. Press 2005).
46. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 5 (1948). Rossiter discuses expansive statutes conferring “extreme discretionary
authority upon the President or his administration” during a crisis. Id. at 269.

210

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 12:203

fewer rights.”47 Rossiter argues war, rebellion, and economic depression authorize the execution of emergency powers.48 From suppressing insurrection to crushing sovereign enemies to economic hardship, there are certain events that,
according to Rossiter, require speedy, and arguably unilateral, intervention by the
federal government.49 The result, if any of these specific crises arise, is a “constitutional dictatorship,” a “regime which can act arbitrarily and even dictatorially
in the swift adoption of measures designed to save the state and its people from
the destructive effects of the particular crisis.”50 In other words, the goal of constitutional dictatorship is to “end the crisis and restore normal times” without
changing the “political, social and economic structure” of society and does not
continue in a state of emergency for an infinite time period.51 Under this theory,
the constitutional dictator, typically the President, can violate the law, position
itself as a legislative body or assume judicial power if necessary.52
Giorgio Agamben fuses theories of Schmitt and Rossiter, arguing that we live
in times of indefinite emergency, which has effectively normalized crisis government. Agamben notes that public fear and the desire for urgent action has created
a default deferential standard for government to address any and all emergencies.53 This “unbound” view of crisis government is linked to Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule’s theory that the executive is “unbound.” Posner and Vermeule
argue that the only constraint on crisis government is public opinion. They challenge the traditional model of liberal constitutionalism, or liberal legalism, which
supports a framework where “legislatures govern and should govern, subject to
constitutional constraints, while the executive and judicial officials carry out the
law” to harvest a world where “law does and should constrain the executive.”54
The problem, according to Posner and Vermeule, is that liberal constitutionalism
struggles to account for the administrative state, and thus the massive delegation
of emergency authorities to the executive has effectively relegated “legislatures
and courts to the sidelines,” making legal constraints weak during normal times
and non-existent in times of emergency.55 In fact, Posner and Vermeule argue
that this is, normatively, the most efficient and expedient way to manage crises,
thereby discarding—or rather, displacing—the role of Madisonian government
during times of crisis.
This view finds the Madisonian vision of separation of powers uniquely inadequate during an era of extraordinary power centered with the executive branch
and administrative state. The traditional constraints on crisis government—separation of powers or law—are relegated to weak positions of utility, meaning that
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at. 7.
Id.
Id. at 9.
AGAMBEN, supra note 45.
ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 3 (2010).
Id. at 4.
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politics and public opinion, instead, are the only constraints on government in
times of emergency. During crises, the public demands rapid response from government. This causes legislators and judges to “hand the reins to the executive
and hope for the best.”56 Posner and Vermeule argue that the “central fallacy of
liberal legalism” is the equation of “a constrained executive with an executive
constrained by law.”57 Instead, Posner and Vermeule argue that there exists “de
facto political constraints” that have taken the place of “legal constraints on the
executive,” and instead offer a stronger—tightened—grip on the executive than
traditional separation of powers or law-based restraints.58
Under an “executive unbound” theory, judicial review, unlike Justice Black’s
support for the Court’s role in reviewing and constraining executive action in
Youngstown, is incapable of effectively dealing with crises. Courts, therefore,
should act deferentially to the executive during times of crisis, largely due to the
slow pace and rigidity with which courts approach problems that, for all intents
and purposes, needs flexibility during times of emergency.59 There are information and knowledge gaps that courts simply do not have according to Posner and
Vermeule. Legislative bodies also typically take a back seat during times of emergency because of the “lack of information about what is happening” and the
“inability to act quickly and with one voice.”60 As a result, legislatures over decades have delegated emergency authority to the executive to avoid “legislating”
during the crisis.61 Indeed, modern-day crisis government effectively transfers
the power to declare emergencies to the executive without the legislature ever
having a say in how to manage the crisis, when to end the crisis, or why to even
address the emergency in the first place.62 This one-sided approach to crisis government tends to track the predominant conception of the executives’ Article II
powers being vast and expansive. Indeed, this reality means that during times of
emergency, “the executive governs nearly alone, at least so far as law is concerned,”
and that the “legally constrained executive is now a historical curiosity.”63
A consequence of this expansive evolution of Presidential power during times
of emergency is the interpretation of Article II’s Executive Power Clause becoming lost in translation, or modified and altered so significantly over decades, both
politically and doctrinally, that the executive power is, arguably, a shadow of its
former — original — self. Julian Mortsenson’s recent scholarship tracking the
early seventeenth- and eighteenth-century understanding of the “executive
power” offers a window into an originalist interpretation of the Executive Power

56. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2009).
57. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 54, at 5.
58. Id.
59. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 4–6 (2007).
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 54, at 4.
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Clause, one that may revive the dormant, and arguably displaced, theory of liberal
constitutionalism in emergency powers doctrine.
II. THE EXECUTIVE POWER: EXECUTE THE LAW AND NOTHING MORE
A. Theories of the Executive Power Clause
Part II seeks to bridge an originalist understanding of the Executive Power
Clause with liberal constitutionalism’s emergency powers. According to recent
scholarship, the “Executive Power Clause is incapable of giving rise to any substantive foreign affairs authority, much less an indefeasible one.”64 This conclusion is grounded in an originalist and “descriptive historical assertion about the
semantic content of a standard eighteenth-century” understanding of the “executive power.”65 There are three primary interpretations of the Executive Power
Clause set forth by Mortenson—the Cross-Reference Theory, the Royal
Residuum, and the Law Execution Theory. Of these three, the Law Execution
Theory, according to Mortenson, most accurately defines and conceptualizes the
original meaning of the executive power as “unambiguously limited to law execution.”66 Little, if any, connection in legal scholarship has been made between
this newly discovered originalist understanding of the Executive Power Clause
and its potential relationship to liberal constitutionalism’s conception of emergency powers. The basic idea, that the original understanding of the Clause was
that the executive power was nothing more than the power to execute the laws
created by Congress, deserves greater exploration for its utility in reviving liberal
constitutionalism, which has arguably been displaced by the relativist theory of
unfettered, absolute executive powers over national security and foreign affairs.
1. The Cross-Reference Theory
The first theory of the Executive Power Clause is a “thinner” Cross-Reference
reading of the power to mean that the President has broad authority, but that it is
limited to a “grab bag” of items set forth under Article II.67 Some Justices, such
as Jackson in Youngstown, have adopted this “grab bag” view of the Clause, noting that, “I cannot accept the view that [the Executive Power Clause] is a grant in
bulk of all conceivable executive powers but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.”68 As Mortenson explains,
the “full contents of that grab bag are set out in the remainder of Article II [and]
nothing else goes in the bag.”69 Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein have argued
that the executive powers are fixed within Article II express provisions.70
64. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1172 n.10.
65. Id. at 1188.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1172 n.10.
68. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952).
69. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1179.
70. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 49–52 (1994).
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Likewise, Robert Reinstein notes that the Executive Power Clause is not a “residual source of plenary presidential powers beyond those enumerated in Article
II.”71 The Royal Residuum theory interprets the power quite differently.
2. Royal Residuum
The Royal Residuum thesis of the Executive Power Clause suggests the executive
power is a “well-understood bundle of authorities that went well beyond the specific enumerations elsewhere in Article II.”72 Here, the power extends to and includes the “residual foreign affairs powers” not set out in the Constitution.73 This dominant view was
articulated by Theodore Roosevelt, that the “executive power was limited only by specific restrictions [in the Constitution or] imposed by Congress.”74 The result, according
to Mortenson, is a President who has been indefeasibly granted “those aspects of kingly
authority that have not been reallocated to other actors.”75 It seems that this theory is nestled somewhere within or between Youngstown’s Zone Two or Three, both of which
suggest the President may act if Congress is silent on or expressly disapproves of the
act.76 But this theory has been met with some limiting interpretations.
Although the Constitution is silent regarding any specific emergency powers vested
in the President, the Supreme Court has also noted in Youngstown that there is no inherent executive power and the President may only act with constitutional or statutory
authority. This reading suggests that neither the Commander in Chief Clause nor the
Take Care Clause is appropriate constitutional provisions that grant the President such
unilateral powers.77 Nonetheless, the dominant view of expansive Presidential powers inherent beyond the text of the Constitution—the Royal Residuum theory—has captivated
modern executive powers theory, even if the majority of the Supreme Court has yet to
accept that dominant view.78 Indeed, this view envisions a monarch-like executive that
“establishes a presumption that the President will enjoy those foreign affairs powers that
were traditionally part of the executive power.”79
3. Law Execution
This Essay is focused on a third view that receives less attention than the abovementioned views—the “Law Execution” theory. This theory of the Executive
Power Clause interprets the words to mean the “power to executive the law.”80
President William Taft once explained that the “true view of the Executive functions

71. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 264 (2009).
72. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1181.
73. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 37–38 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
74. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388–89 (1913).
75. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1183.
76. Id.
77. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641–46 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
78. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1183.
79. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231, 234 (2001).
80. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1180 n.10.
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is . . . that the President can exercise no power which cannot be . . . traced to some
specific grant of power or justly implied . . . within such express grant as . . . necessary to its exercise . . . . There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise.”81 Likewise, Justice Breyer has explained that the executive power is the
“energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws.”82 This view in
many respects adheres to the notion that the “executive power enables the President
to spearhead” the implementation of “an affirmative project of the legislature.”83 As
Michael McConnell suggests, the power to execute the law is to carry into “effect
policies set by the lawmaker.”84 And, as Justice Burger noted, “[i]nterpreting a law
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of
‘execution’ of the law.”85
As such, if the “Executive Power Clause is incapable of giving rise to any substantive foreign affairs authority,” it is equally the case that the Clause does not
give rise to an emergency power unless there is statutory authority. From this
view, the “Constitution does not vest in the president a general, independent lawmaking power in foreign affairs.”86 Other scholars have carved out a two-track
approach, one that was fixated on separation of powers that “distinguishes
between law-making and the implementation of the law in particular instances.”87
Indeed, this was the theory that the Executive Power Clause was merely to “execute plans, instructions, and above all else the laws.”88 However, recent scholarship offers persuasive evidence to suggest that the meaning of the Executive
Power Clause was “unambiguously limited to law execution.”89
B. Originalist Interpretations of the Executive Power
1. English Interpretations
William Blackstone, as early as the 1600s, carved out two distinct classifications of governmental powers between the “legislative” authority of “making . . .
the laws” and the “executive” authority as “enforcing the laws” which according
to Blackstone derived from the English Constitution’s conception of separate political institutions.90 This was purportedly the “King’s Prerogative,” which meant
that there existed a menu of substantive powers. Mortenson likens these powers
to the Youngstown Zone Two model of presidential powers in which the

81. Mortenson, supra note 11 at 1180 (quoting WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE
AND HIS POWERS 139–40 (1916)).

82. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
83. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1180.
84. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING 42 (2020).
85. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
86. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 309, 314 (2006); see also id. at 344–59 (broadly discussing the limitations the President faces in
foreign affairs lawmaking).
87. WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 5 (1965).
88. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1269.
89. Id. at 1188.
90. See id. at 1221 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146).
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President acts in the absence of congressional denial or grant of authority.91 Of
course, this doesn’t tell us what criteria should be used to determine when the executive has acted impermissibly, but instead leaves that decision to the circumstances of the events that led to the executive’s action. But, according to
Blackstone, this meant that the Crown could act on its “residual and defeasible
authority” when Parliament had neither approved nor disapproved of certain acts
by the Crown,92 but when Parliament exercised its ability to provide “supplementary legislation,” then it would displace the Crown’s power.93
Indeed, the “supreme executive power” defined by Blackstone was the right to
enforce the laws; that is, the royal prerogative. Likewise, the founding generation
relied upon this same basic framework of legal authorities to the Crown—the
Executive—that could be wielded, so long as the Parliament did not override it
with countervailing authority.94 But the royal “prerogative” had a very specific
meaning in the English law, one that entailed “all powers, preheminences, and
priviledges, which the law giveth to the crowne [sic].”95 The executive power,
according to Mortenson, was only a part of the whole—a “discrete subset”—of
the Crown’s list of prerogatives, and that power was only the power to execute
the laws given to the executive by the legislature.96
John Locke wrote that there existed the “legislative power” and the executive
power, and that the former was the “right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed,” while the latter was the ability to pursue the “execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force.”97 Algernon Sidney, an
English politician, explained that the legislature was “exercised in making Laws”
and the executive power to implement law.98 Sir Robert Filmer explained that the
“gubernative” had the power to merely put “those laws in execution” that the legislative “power of making laws”99 and that there “be a power in kings both to
judge when the laws are duly executed, and when not. . . .”100 Jean-Jacques
Rousseau was quite clear that, likewise, the “executive power . . . is only the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1229 (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON bk. 2, ch. 5, § 125, at 90b (Francis
Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., London, Luke Hansard & Sons 16th ed. 1809) (1628)).
96. Id.at 1230.
97. Id. at 1231 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION ch. XIV, §§ 143–144, at 164 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE]).
98. Id. at 1231 (quoting ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT ch. I, § 1, at 4
(London, n. pub. 1698)).
99. Id. at 1232 (quoting ROBERT FILMER, THE ANARCHY OF A LIMITED OR MIXED MONARCHY (1648)
reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 131, 136 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991)).
100. Id. at 1233 n.276 (quoting FILMER, THE FREE-HOLDERS GRAND INQUEST, (1679) reprinted in
PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS at 114 [hereinafter FILMER, THE FREE-HOLDERS GRAND INQUEST]).
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instrument for applying the law.”101 This followed a cadre of English scholars
who saw the executive power as a separate element of a long list of prerogatives.
James I noted that “so yee may be a good King . . . in establishing and executing, (which is the life of the Law) good Lawes among your people.”102 And John
Milton noted that the “King was created to put . . . laws in execution.”103 And
James Otis explained that the “supreme legislative” and the “supreme executive”
check each other.104 It was common for the King to be known as the “supreme
Magistrate of the Kingdom” who was entrusted with “the whole executive Power
of the Law.”105 Beyond the words of English and French scholars and historians,
dictionaries also offered guidance. For example, “to execute” was defined as “to
put a law, or any thing planned, in practice.”106 Further, amid the founding generation, dictionaries were nearly unanimous in their definitions of the executive
power.107 The act of exercising the executive power was understood to be “the
power of . . . enforcing laws,” or “executing the laws,” or “carrying the laws into
execution,” or the “power to use” the law to put into effect.108 Indeed, as
Mortenson argues, the “executive was subject to plenary control and instruction
by parliamentary legislation . . .” and without this prior instruction, the executive
power “is an empty vessel that has nothing to execute.”109
2. Constitutional Interpretations
From a constitutional standpoint, Mortenson argues that the English interpretations of
the executive power suggest that the translation in the American constitutional system is
“pretty straightforward . . . [i]t was the implementing power [such as] the authority to
deploy the massed force of the state to bring legislated intentions into effect.”110 He likens the concept to something akin to an action of “bringing-into-being” decisions about
governmental action “of any sort—which for their part could only be designated by an
exercise of legislative power.”111 Mortenson explains:

101. Id. at 1232 (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. III, ch. 15, at 142
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) (1762)).
102. Id. at 1233 n.274 (quoting JAMES I, BASILIKON DORON bk. 2 (1616), reprinted in THE POLITICAL
WORKS OF JAMES I, at 3, 18 (Charles Howard McIlwain ed., 1918)).
103. Id. at 1233 n.275 (quoting JOHN MILTON, A DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND (1692)
[hereinafter MILTON, DEFENCE OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE], reprinted in 2 THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN
MILTON 5, 106 (Philadelphia, John W. Moore 1847)).
104. Id. at 1233 n.278 (quoting JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
71 (London, reprinted for J. Almon 1764)).
105. Id. at 1234 (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR A
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER
HEADS ch. 1, § 1, at 2 (London, Eliz. Nutt 1716)).
106. Id. at 1235 n.286 (quoting FRANCIS ALLEN, A COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London,
printed for J. Wilson & J. Fell 1765)).
107. Mortenson, supra note 1, at 1315.
108. Id. at 1317.
109. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1235.
110. Id. at 1237.
111. Id. at 1238.
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The implementation of authoritatively formulated intent was intrinsic to the
very concept of the executive function, both grammatically and in principle.
By the Founding, the implementatory [sic] essence of executive power was
most often expressed in terms of Locke’s vision of law as an interlocking tripartite phenomenon: First the law must be legislated, then in at least some
cases it must be adjudicated, and then its requirements must be executed.
While this trinitarian scheme still dominates our modern understanding of the
law-related functions of government, it’s worth noting that many joined
Blackstone in describing the essential powers of government as two interlocked halves of a whole: the “legislative . . . authority” as “the right . . . of
making . . . the laws,” and the “executive authority” as “the right . . . of enforcing’ them. . . . That’s because all formulations were identical on the crucial
point: Exercising “the executive power” meant bringing the legislated intentions of society into being.112

Indeed, this conception was closely followed by a number of philosophers of
the founding generation who took the position that the “executive power is
strictly no other than the legislative carried forward . . . and controulable by it
[sic],”113 while others regarded the power “altogether subordinate to the legislative. . . .”114 Some hoisted the legislative power above the executive power, noting that the “Legislative power . . . is the chief of the two.”115
III. ORIGINALISM, LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EMERGENCY
Liberal constitutionalism envisions a legal world in which the executive power
is closely regulated and constrained by the rule of law. Here, liberal constitutionalists are concerned with the threat of the delegation of powers to the executive,
thus compromising the tradition of separation of powers, while at the same time
fearful of crises that abruptly “required the executive to take necessary measures
without clear legal authorization.”116 Specifically, much of the founding generation’s concern was assignment of powers undermining the Madisonian separation
of powers framework. Liberal constitutionalists, such as James Madison, argued
for a separation of powers-centric approach to government, even in times of crisis. The traditional model of liberal constitutionalism in the realm of emergency
powers has been for the legislature to pass laws that delegate to the executive
authority to regulate, act, and make policy decisions during crises. In other words,
legislatures enact and create the rules, while the executive enforces those rules.
Some have argued that this creates a passive parliamentary model, where the

112. Id. (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *146).
113. GAD HITCHCOCK, AN ELECTION SERMON (1774), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 281, 295 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983).
114. DAVID HUME, ESSAY VI: OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT 44 (1777).
115. PHILIP HUNTON, A TREATISE OF MONARCHY pt. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 26 (London, printed for John
Bellamy and Ralph Smith 1643).
116. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 54, at 8.
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legislature stands by during times of emergency, relying upon the expertise and
efficiency of the executive to address a crisis. This approach to governance generally
and in times of emergency has receded into the background since the twentieth century. The long-standing approach to emergency powers doctrine under liberal constitutionalism was to allow the legislature to enact a statute that served the purpose
of a blueprint or a guide to what the executive does during times of emergency.
Much of what liberal constitutionalists have sought to achieve between delegation and emergency is a loose version of the Law Execution theory; that is, the
Executive Power Clause is nothing more than the power to execute the laws, as
persuasively argued by Mortenson. Here, we see efforts by Congress over decades to balance separation of powers with the power of the executive. These efforts
entailed, for example, the creation of “administrative procedures and mechanisms
of legislative and judicial oversight that would enforce legal constraints on the
executive.”117 But, if Article II powers, from an original understanding, are premised on the power of the executive to execute the laws set forth by the legislature,
and nothing more, then these attempts at threading the needle, so to speak, have
fallen short of the traditional Madisonian model of separation of powers.
Congress has arguably failed to create emergency laws that require the executive
to “carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power” and to
implement “substantive legal requirements and authorities that were created” by the
legislature.118 Instead, the “projects” and “substantive legal requirements” to be carried out and implemented function more like procedural framework statutes that
“attempt to constrain executive action” in times of emergency, instead of defining
the projects and substantive legal requirements for the executive to follow.119 There
is a reason why scholars have criticized these approaches to crisis government.
Legislatures have become accustomed to deference to the executive, perhaps
because they know they lack the information about the true nature of the security
threat to a nation and “lack control over the police and military” and likewise cannot “act quickly and with one voice.”120 The modern American statutory framework for emergency powers effectively strips the legislature from legislating
during the emergency.121 As a result, the current frameworks of emergency
powers do not look or operate like the Madisonian government of checks and balances envisioned in the Constitution. As Ginsburg and Versteeg explain, scholars
view the modern regime as one that enjoys “massive delegation of power to the
executive” and that legislatures and courts play a reactive role, effectively allowing the executive to govern alone during times of crisis.122 That result is the antithesis of liberal constitutionalism and Madisonian government.

117. Id. at 9.
118. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1172–73.
119. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 54, at 9.
120. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 59, at 47.
121. Id. at 47.
122. Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the
Pandemic, INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2, 8) (available online) (citing ERIC A.
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Historically, the problem is that when emergencies such as economic crisis or
war arise, the executive ignored Congress or concocted dubious arguments of
avoidance. But the reality is that liberal constitutionalism has struggled equally to
balance the world of separation of powers, delegation and emergency. As a result,
liberal constitutionalism has arguably failed to “reconcile the administrative state
with the Madisonian origins of American government,” which encourages deliberation and coordination during times of emergency, instead depending upon excessive delegation to the executive.123 This has been caused by a loose patchwork
of statutes and laws that function as procedural, rather than substantive, mechanisms to constrain, ex post, the executive during an emergency.124 However, contrary to Posner and Vermeule, the executive-centered government in the
administrative state is not “inevitable” or a foregone conclusion.125 Further, it is
simply not true that “law cannot hope to constrain the modern executive” and liberal constitutionalism “overestimates the need for the separation of powers and
even the rule of law.”126
The problem is that Congress, as a result of its excessive application and practice of the relativist theory of emergency powers, has underestimated the strength
of a Madisonian-like Law Execution theory of the Executive Power Clause. A
renewed focus on the executive power as understood to be “the power of . . .
enforcing laws,” or “executing the laws” or “carrying the laws into execution” or
the “power to use” the law to put into effect127 may revive liberal constitutionalism in emergency powers by reorienting the lens through which Congress views
its role from one fixated on constraining the executive through loose, and arguably ineffective, procedural frameworks, to one focused on implementing substantive legal requirements for the executive to “carry out projects” during times
of emergency. Indeed, there is room for a revival of liberal constitutionalism to
reposition itself as a theory that encourages the legislatures to make laws and govern more directly in times of emergency. There are both political and doctrinal
implications for a renewed emphasis on the Law Execution theory of the
Executive Power Clause in relation to emergency powers doctrine.
A. Political Implications
Legislatures often impose limitations or grant additional powers to the executive during times of emergency through statute. Throughout the world, many
countries have emergency provisions inserted into their Constitutions, while in
countries, ordinary legislation provides the vehicle through which crisis governments form during times of emergency. A substantial majority of nations have

Posner & Adrian Vermeule, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2011)).
123. Id.
124. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 54, at 10.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 14–15.
127. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1221.
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constitutional provisions that permit a declaration of the emergency state.128 In
many provisions, the government has the power to suspend certain rights for a
limited period of time. A majority of Constitutions worldwide mandate the legislature to declare the state of emergency, which is also accompanied by end dates
for which the emergency powers expire.129 These constitutional provisions also
ensure that the emergency government is dependent upon and subject to legislative oversight and review.130 Likewise, many Constitutions set forth the reasons
for or limited circumstances in which a declaration of emergency may be activated. As Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg explain, “while constitutional emergency regimes allow the executive to assume additional powers, they rarely
authorize a truly unbound executive.”131
This purportedly maintains legislative collaboration and decision-making during the crisis. In these types of emergency regimes, the legislature designates
powers to be granted to the executive and maintains the power to rein in those
authorities.132 Such powers are divided into ex ante and ex post frameworks. The
former permits the executive to exercise certain powers within its discretion during an emergency, thus putting the legislature in the back seat and allowing the
executive to drive the decision-making process on how to address the crisis, while
the latter permits the legislature to overturn the executive’s initial declaration of
emergency after a certain period of time.
An originalist conception of the Law Execution theory may alter the way we
understand the usefulness and limitations of modern emergency frameworks,
such as the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act. The National Emergencies Act, passed in the 1970s, terminated all previous emergencies that had been activated by former Presidents.
As a result, Presidents are required to declare a national emergency and follow
specific procedures thereafter, while Congress reserved the power to terminate
any emergency declaration with a joint resolution, but that which could be
thwarted by the Presidential veto power. Likewise, the Act requires that Congress
meet and vote on terminating the emergency every six months. While the Act
was meant to “temper the potentially dictatorial powers available to the president” and to “ensure that proper safeguards were in place to allow for congressional review when the president declared an emergency,” the procedures have
been ineffective in giving Congress a more active role in governing and legislating during times of emergency.133 Instead, the Act proactively delegates the
power to declare an emergency to the executive and effectively requires the
128. Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions, 16 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 101, 101 (2018).
129. Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122, at 30.
130. Id. at 30–31.
131. Id. at 10.
132. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 212 (2004).
133. Gerald S. Dickinson, The National Emergencies Act Was Never Meant for Something Like
Trump’s Wall, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/3BMX-Q7UB.
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executive to address an emergency however he sees fit. As Frank Church, the cochair of the special committee on national emergencies explained during testimony to Congress in the 1970s, “Congress should be forewarned that it is inherent in the nature of modern government that the Executive will seek to enlarge its
power in small ways and large.”134
President Trump’s border wall national emergency declaration is perhaps a
quintessential example of how the executive can play fast and loose with the
weak procedural constraints set forth in the Act to abuse and enlarge its power
over domestic and foreign affairs, while also altering the power of the congressional purse with the stroke of pen. As Church feared, a President could, if he
chose, “invoke the emergency authories . . . for frivolous or partisan matters”
unrelated to concrete, particularized national security or foreign crisis.135 There,
President Trump, after months of stonewalling by Congress to block billions in
funding for Trump’s wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, declared a national
emergency over illegal immigration across the border as a threat to national security, even though “[i]llegal crossings [were] at the lowest ebb since the Clinton
administration.”136
The declaration effectively activated for the President a variety of statutes that
would allow him to unilaterally shift unauthorized congressional monies from
one executive department to another in order to build the wall. This circumvention was met with only the weak procedural safeguards available in the Act, for
which Congress failed to terminate the emergency after the President exercised
his veto power. This was not the first time that the “procedural requirements for
reporting and congressional oversight have simply not been followed by either
the executive or Congress,” as the President has multiple times in the past provided “sparse details of the basis for the purported emergency,” while Congress
has rarely “considered whether to terminate any of these purported emergencies.”137 Indeed, as Lobel explains, the “procedures Congress has established to
review these emergencies are legally unenforceable in the courts [and] [i]t is hard
to discern any progress from the post-war era of drastic abuses that Congress
wanted to end.”138 Much of this is a result of overreliance on the relativist theory
of emergency powers that delegates power to the President, with very little, if
any, substantive requirements to carry out such projects. In fact, Congress has
never reversed a President’s national emergency declaration.139
Another political implication for a renewed understanding of the Law
Execution Theory of Article II’s Executive Power Clause and its political implications is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Act purportedly restrains crisis government in foreign affairs. Like the NEA, the IEEPA is
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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Id.
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Lobel, supra note 15, at 1415–16.
Id. at 1418.
Robert Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, YALE L.J.F. 590, 591 (2020).
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procedural, not substantive in nature. It places conditions on the President’s
power after he has declared a national emergency by requiring some consultation
with Congress, including reporting dates and a six-month timeline. However,
unlike the NEA, the IEEPA did insert some substantive provisions that provided
a basis for which the President could declare a national emergency in the international economic realm. There, the statute defined a national emergency as “any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of
the United States.” If invoked, the President may block financial transactions
with individuals, industries or governments that are viewed as a threat. The
President also has at his disposal the ability to freeze property and bank accounts.
Further, the statute also imposed a requirement that the President declare a
national emergency over such threats when they arise. Some may argue that the
IEEPA departs slightly from the NEA in that it addresses an area that the NEA
does not: creating standards and criteria for invoking emergency powers. Still,
like the NEA, the IEEPA has been undermined, ignored or circumvented by presidential administrations per a relativist approach to expansive executive powers.
Most invocations of the statute have been due to non-threatening national emergencies, such as those against South Africa, Libya, Panama and Nicaragua in the
1980s.140 Indeed, the sweeping powers entrenched in the IEEPA, along with a
lack of checks and balances, make the law an avenue for executive abuse. Shortly
after the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush invoked the IEEPA
to close Muslim American charities and freeze their assets due to suspicion of
connections with terrorists overseas, even though there was very little evidence.
Much of the abuse and misuse of the IEEPA is administrations that ignore the
substantive requirement of “unusual and extraordinary threat.” And like the
NEA, Congress can only rein in the President’s power after he declares a national
emergency under the IEEPA only by passing a new law that the President then
must sign, or if the President fails to sign, getting a supermajority vote to override
the veto. Even with the procedural safeguards inserted into the statute, the use of
those provisions is dismal. In fact, Congress has never voted to terminate an
IEEPA emergency.
These procedural deficiencies and lack of substantive controls by Congress
raise questions as to the political implications for emergency powers when
viewed from a revived Law Execution Theory of the Executive Powers Clause.
Does the current statutory framework of emergency power fit neatly with
Mortenson’s revised theory of the executive power?
The Law Execution theory suggests that Congress’s modern statutory framework is divorced from the Madisonian conception of emergency powers that liberal constitutionalism envisions. If we agree that the original meaning of the
executive power was “unambiguously limited to . . . execution”141 of law set forth
140. Lobel, supra note 15, at 1385, 1415.
141. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1188.
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by legislative authority and for the executive “to put a law, or any thing planned,
in practice,”142 then it would seem that mere procedural constraints under the
NEA, for example, are not in keeping with the historical and original understanding of the Executive Power Clause. In other words, the “executive [is] subject to
plenary control and instruction by parliamentary legislation . . .” and without this
prior instruction, the executive power “is an empty vessel that has nothing to execute.”143 A “prior instruction” is not, and should not, be simply procedural constraints outlined in loose fashion within a statute. Instead, “prior instruction”
should be focused on substantive law that allows the legislature to govern during
times of emergency in coordination with the executive. The most recent national
emergency as a result of the international pandemic is an example of how legislatures and the executive can, in the Madisonian sense of crisis government, work
in coordination and meld together liberal constitutionalism in emergency powers
doctrine and the Law Execution theory.144
For example, emergency responses to the pandemic by some legislatures
across the world entail refusing to “grant certain powers to the executive,” while
in other instances the interactions between the legislature and the executive have
“taken the form of collaboration, such as when the legislatures pass new laws in
consultation with the executive.”145 Indeed, one could surmise that the Law
Execution Theory of the Executive Power Clause envisions what liberal constitutionalists view as not only checks and balances, but also a relationship between
the two branches in times of emergency that “take of the form of cooperation and
dialogue” instead of the inherent, expansive, and unilateral approach so
entrenched in our current constitutional structure under the relativist theory and
the Royal Residuum theory. During times of crisis, such as an international pandemic, there is evidence that legislatures will assert themselves “by enacting new
laws” that constrain but also guide, regulate and coordinate with the executive.146
This is the quinntessential ideal of liberal constitutionalism: legislatures that play
the “Madisonian role of limiting the executive to measures adopted by law.”147
The Law Execution theory — that the executive power is nothing more than
the power to execute the laws set forth by Congress — has a variety of other political implications. While a response to an emergency might take longer, such
coordinated and deliberate efforts by Congress to enact laws setting forth substantive requirements of the executive, but still retaining control and power during
times of emergency, may “produce better reason-giving, forced by the back and
forth between the different branches.”148 Likewise, the Law Execution Theory
may facilitate, not a unilateral system of the executive unbound, but one in which

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See ALLEN, supra note 106.
Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1235.
Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122, at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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Congress prepared law that, when executed by the executive, had “multiple
branches of government . . . involved in formulating the response.”149 This,
according to Ginsburg and Versteeg, “might demonstrate a consensus among
institutions with their own distinct bases of legitimacy.”150 Legislative involvement in the execution of the law, or at least coordination, may help “identify blind
spots in governmental decision-making, as well as to force careful consideration
to ensure that errors are not simply repeated because of inertia.”151 It seems that,
under a more narrow understanding of the Law Execution Theory, the Executive
Power Clause in times of emergency could be interpreted and applied in a manner
that encourages a response to emergencies “through the involvement of multiple
branches of government, with an executive that is bound to interact with other
branches of government, which would be in keeping with traditional notions of
liberal constitutionalism.”152 And the value of legislatures having “distinct advantages as arenas for policy debate” should not be lost in translation here.153
In fact, one could argue that this “interbranch dialogue” is in fact the essence
of what the original understanding of the Executive Power Clause was meant to
achieve.154 In other words, the traditional sense of the executive power is not, as
Posner and Vermeule suggest, one in which the executive is not unbound but
instead bound by and to the legislature’s prior actions, setting forth substantive
requirements and projects that must be carried out, not necessarily alone, but in
collaboration with, the legislature.
Indeed, the NEA, for example, is devoid of substantive legal requirements, criterias, and other concrete tasks that govern how the executive is to address emergencies, instead handing the President carte blanche to do as he pleases, with
easy escape hatches built into the procedural safeguards. The Law Execution
theory and its original understanding, as persuasively argued by Mortenson, suggests that modern emergency statutes are hollow and weak examples of the kind
of crisis government that liberal constitutionalism envisions, one that is truly a
sharing and coordination of powers between the executive and legislative
branches. Indeed, there is room for normative policy proposals when revisiting
liberal constitutionalism with the scalpel of the original understanding of the
Executive Power Clause in hand.
As Ginsburg and Versteeg explain, some countries “require the legislature to
declare the emergency that activates the legislation” during times of emergency.155 This rather simple tweak in process seems to conform more neatly with
the Law Execution theory of executive powers, because it entrusts the decision to

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise - Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (2006).
155. Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122, at 11.
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determine whether an emergency exists within the legislature. This might translate into legislatures accompanying the authority to declare an emergency with
substantive legal requirements that the executive must follow in order to keep the
emergency in force. As Locke explained, the legislative power was the “right to
direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed” while the executive power was the ability to pursue the “execution of the laws that are made, and
remain in force.”156 This ex ante and ex post framework may permit the legislature to enjoy involvement in the emergency and “allow tailoring to the specific
needs of the crisis at hand.”157 But a longstanding focus on legislative responses
to expansive executive powers during times of emergency seemed to have been
accepted from scholars and jurists for decades. Edwin Corwin once explained, in
discussing Youngstown, “[t]he best escape from presidential autocracy in the age
we inhabit is not, in short, judicial review, which can supply only a vacuum, but
timely legislation.”158 Yet, reimagining liberal constitutionalism in a world where
the Law Execution Theory of executive power is predominant may shift jurists
and scholars back to emphasizing the role of courts.
B. Doctrinal Implications
There are two primary versions of the predominant view of the Royal
Residuum Theory of the Executive Power Clause that color the Court’s doctrinal
landscape. The first is that the President enjoys defeasible powers that authorize
him to exercise his powers anytime he believes necessary, “so long as neither the
Constitution nor any specific statute forbids it.”159 Doctrinally, this approach fits
into Justice Jackson’s third model of his tripartite test.160 The more aggressive
approach is that Article II grants indefeasible powers that effectively allow the
President to do anything he believes necessary for the preservation of the nation
during times of emergency short of violating the Constitution.
The U.S. Constitution does not have a state of emergency or crisis government
provision that permits either Congress or the executive branch to declare a
national emergency, but it does reserve some powers to the military and Congress
in special circumstances. For example, under Article I, the Congress can suspend
the writ of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”161 Further, Congress may exercise the powers of martial law and
may “provide for the calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”162 Nonetheless, the “Constitution does not

156. See Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1231 (quoting LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, at 164).
157. Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122, at 11.
158. CORWIN, supra note 28, at 157.
159. Mortenson, supra note 1, at 1269, 1272.
160. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (defining Zone Three as presidential
action invalid if prohibited by congressional act or Constitution).
161. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (U.S.).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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expressly grant any such [emergency] power to the President.”163 Still, the Court
has, for decades, helped alter its own power to review executive actions. In
Curtiss-Wright, the Court noted that the executive has “plenary and exclusive
power” over foreign affairs. The Court went further in Korematsu v. United
States, explaining that the Court should not reject or question the military’s
claims of necessity.164 As Trevor Morrison explains, the “question of judicial
review does not arise” in executive exercises of power because of a nearly
assumed deference to the executive in matters implicating foreign affairs or
national security.165
A few of the Supreme Court’s Royal Residuum theorists support an expansive
interpretation of the Executive Power Clause, but incorrectly understood the original meaning. Justice Clarence Thomas, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, explained:
Founding-era evidence reveals that the ‘executive Power’ included the foreign
affairs powers of a sovereign State . . . . William Blackstone, for example,
described the executive power in England as including foreign affairs powers
. . . . This view of executive power was widespread at the time of the framing
of the Constitution . . . . Given this pervasive view of executive power, it is
unsurprising that those who ratified the Constitution understood the “executive
Power” vested by Article II to include those foreign affairs powers not otherwise allocated in the Constitution.166

As Mortenson has pointed out, this broad and expansive view of the Executive
Power Clause under the Royal Residuum Theory incorrectly states the historical
record, yet Thomas’s view is widely shared and held across a variety of
Presidential administrations, as well as a few other members of the Court.
The Court in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project weighed similar expansive arguments from the government.167 There, the federal government
argued that the “‘exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty’ that is
both an aspect of the ‘legislative power’ and also ‘is inherent in the executive
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.’”168 The late-Justice Antonin
Scalia likewise explained that the Executive Power Clause “does not mean some
of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”169 He elaborated by noting that, “[i]t is not for us to determine . . . how much of the purely executive
163. CHRIS EDELSON & LOUIS FISHER, EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FROM THE DRAFTING OF
WAR ON TERROR 7 (2013).
164. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944).
165. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1189, 1196–97 (2006).
166. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 35–37 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
168. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017)
(No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 3475820 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542 (1950)).
169. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1).
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powers of government must be within the full control of the President.”170 The
Court in Trump v. Hawaii effectively, “brushed aside any effort to limit the emergency-based rationales to situations where Congress would have a hard time
reacting quickly.”171 Indeed, there is a link between the dissenting opinions in
Youngstown, expressing approval for expansive executive powers that are nothing short of constitutional violations, according Royal Residuum theorists such as
Scalia and Thomas.
The Court in recent decades has taken a hands-off approach to judicial review
of executive actions over foreign affairs and national security. The Court’s position also seems to suggest that its deference also extends to emergency and crises,
as the Court will “rarely, if ever, scrutinize a President’s motives or the evidence
underlying a crisis claim.”172 This is a departure from Justice Black’s ruling in
Youngstown, which envisioned a role for the judiciary, although limited, in
checking the power of the executive during times of emergency. Much of this
aversion is due to a perception that the Court lacks the competence over national
security issues to insert itself into such decisions. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court
explained that “when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing inferences on
questions of national security,” we lack the competence and knowledge to second-guess the executive.173 Likewise, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Court
explained, “Foreign policy and national security decisions are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy” in which the judiciary does not have aptitude.174 Indeed, the name of the game for the Roberts Court, in particular, has
been to evaluate facts brought forth that substantiate the Executive’s decision as
being entitled to deference.175 This judicial acquiescence results in Presidents
asserting their emergency power and “nearly always prevail[ing].”176 Indeed, the
problem in today’s hyperpolarized politics is the specter of manufactured emergencies by populist executives. The Trump border wall national emergency is
arguably an example of a manufactured emergency to reach a populist policy
goal without regard to Presidential prudence, judicial oversight or congressional
restraint.
What was unclear at that time, is today unequivocal as a result of Mortenson’s
research: American emergency powers doctrine is most accurately grounded in
history and doctrine under the Law Execution Theory in light of the Court’s
Youngstown ruling. There, the Court leaned on judicial review to rein in executive power in Youngstown. Justice Jackson referred to the federal government’s
briefs to elaborate on the expansive argument regarding the seizure of the steel
170. See also id. at 709.
171. Tsai, supra note 139, at 600.
172. Id. at 599.
173. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 34 (2018)).
174. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1414 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J.)).
175. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010).
176. Tsai, supra note 139, at 593.
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mills. There, the federal government argued that the power of seizure in the
Executive Power Clause “constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which
the Government is capable.”177 Justice Jackson gave this argument short shrift,
responding, “[i]f that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to
add several specific items, including some trifling ones.”178 Yet, as discussed
above, Justice Black’s majority ruling in Youngstown is perhaps doctrinally the
best example of the Law Execution Theory influencing the Court’s emergency
powers doctrine.
Black’s ruling fits neatly, when viewed in retrospect from a liberal constitutionalism angle, with a revived Law Execution Theory. There, Black explained,
“if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some
provisions of the Constitution,” and the Constitution is neither “silent nor equivocal about who shall make the laws which the President is to execute.”179 If the
President wanted the power “to issue the order [seizing steel mills]” then that
power “must stem either from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself.”180 He expounded upon, implicitly, elements of the Law Execution
Theory, noting that the “President’s order [seizing steel mills] does not direct that
a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress” and the
“Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress to presidential
. . . supervision or control.”181 He concluded his landmark decision, stating “The
Founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in
both good times and bad times.”182 Harold Koh has argued that the Youngstown
decision is one that urges consensus between Congress and the executive over
substantive foreign policy ends, but that there is a place for the judiciary to
become more involved in these matters.183
This raises questions as to the legitimacy of judicial review in cases where the
executive exercises its powers beyond that narrow interpretation of the Executive
Power Clause under the Law Execution Theory. In other words, in a world where
liberal constitutionalism flourishes under the Law Execution Theory, what role
does the judiciary play? Should the judiciary exercise a more aggressive role in
reining in expansive executive exercises of power that subvert the narrow conception of execution of laws?
Historical doctrine suggests that the Court is certainly capable of imposing a
stronger presence in times of emergency. In Ex parte Milligan, the Court
explained that the government cannot use pretext to exercise martial law and that
such actions had to be in service of a real threat.184 The Court stated that the
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 640–641.
179. Id. at 587 (Jackson, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 585.
181. Id. at 588.
182. Id. at 589.
183. Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1282–85, 1309 (1988).
184. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121, 127 (1866).
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“necessity must be actual and present” and the invasion must be real.”185 In Ex
parte Merryman, Chief Justice Taney ruled President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas unconstitutional, because Lincoln failed to offer evidence of a true
exigency.186 In Youngstown, Justice Black’s, Justice Jackson’s, and Justice
Frankfurter’s opinions supported the Court retaining some power over judicial
review. Jackson noted, “I cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer
if the Court refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent
and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense of Congress.”187
Likewise, Frankfurter noted that “with the utmost unwillingness, with every
desire to avoid judicial inquiry . . . I cannot escape consideration of the legality”
of the President’s actions, and the judiciary, at times, may “have to intervene in
determining where authority lies as between the democratic forces in our scheme
of government” but to be “wary and humble” in doing so.188
What the Law Execution Theory tells us is that judicial oversight of emergencies could be revived alongside liberal constitutionalism. This includes strict and
vigorous review of statutory or constitutional procedural requirements during
times of crisis. The executive must “execute the laws,” and thus, courts must
evaluate whether constitutional and statutory requirements are met. As Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes explain, “[w]hen courts have upheld the government’s actions, they have done so only after a judgment that Congress, as well as
the executive, has endorsed the action.”189 This is nothing new. The Court in
Youngstown insisted upon the executive following legislative authorization.190
But as mentioned above, the Court and the executive have lost their way over the
decades since.
There are substantive arguments for expanded judicial oversight of executive
actions during times of crisis. The Law Execution Theory suggests that, without
prior legislative approval, the executive cannot act. Thus, where the executive
invokes royal residuum powers in contravention of the original understanding of
the Executive Power Clause, and where that action infringes on civil liberties or
fundamental rights, then courts could actively step in. This is a key ingredient to
liberal constitutionalism: that the courts retain some power of review.
CONCLUSION
Political and doctrinal emergency powers discourses have been dominated by
the Royal Residuum theory that views Article II’s Executive Power Clause as an
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expansive, unfettered power over foreign affairs and national security.191 Yet,
many questions have remained unanswered for decades as to “[w]hat is executive
power? What is the degree, and what are the limitations? . . . What are its boundaries?”192 Julian David Mortenson’s recent scholarship provides an historical and
originality basis to argue that the view “must uproot it systematically.”193 This
Article chipped away at the dominant view by focusing its efforts on rethinking
how the expansive view of the Executive Power Clause has, perhaps incorrectly,
been applied to Presidential emergency powers doctrine.
Indeed, it is quite clear that the executive power was simply the power to
“carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power” and to
implement “substantive legal requirements and authorities that were created
somewhere else.”194 The political implications are worthy of consideration.
Legislative involvement in the execution of the law, per the Law Execution
theory, helps “identify blind spots in governmental decision-making, as well as to
force careful consideration to ensure that errors are not simply repeated because
of inertia.”195 The Executive Power Clause in times of emergency, under the
theory, may better support liberal constitutionalism’s conception of “the involvement of multiple branches of government, with an executive that is bound to
interact with other branches of government.”196 Coordinated efforts by Congress
to enact laws setting forth substantive requirements of the executive may, under a
Law Execution theory, “produce better reason-giving, forced by the [back] and
forth between the different branches,” in keeping with the tenors of liberal constitutionalism.197 This may facilitate “multiple branches of government . . . [getting]
involved in formulating the response.”198
Further, the doctrinal implications for invoking a renewed Law Execution
theory as part of liberal constitutionalism are equally worthy of consideration.
Based on Mortenson’s research, it seems that American emergency powers doctrine is most accurately grounded in history and doctrine under the Law
Execution Theory and that judicial oversight of emergencies could be revived
alongside liberal constitutionalism. Indeed, the executive is to “execute the
laws,” and thus, courts could be viewed as institutions that evaluate whether constitutional and statutory requirements, imposed by the legislative branch, are met
during times of emergency.

191. There are other sources of this expansive executive power that scholars and various
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This Article sought to revive liberal constitutionalism in emergency powers
doctrine by arguing that the Law Execution theory of executive power meant the
power “was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or instructions
that needed executing” by the legislature, and this theory provides a basis for a
more narrowed and constrained executive during times of emergency.199 A revised interpretation of the Law Execution theory that references the executive
power as “unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority” may alter
the way scholars understand and appreciate a Madisonian-centric conception of
government, while perhaps influencing how legislators govern and manage
affairs during times of emergency in coordination with, not delegation to, the
executive.

199. Mortenson, supra note 11, at 1169.
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